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I.

Introduction

Why introduce feminist critiques into the biology curriculum? In short, they
are needed to make students better biologists at a time when biology is becom
ing increasingly important in our social discourse. Today's biology students
will be given more physical and social power than any group of people before
them. Biologists will soon be able to alter the course of evolution, cure or
cause epidemic disease, and create new forms of life. Moreover, our culture it
self is asking biologists to address society's major issues-gender, aggression,
health, poverty, legality, land use, and water use. Even legality amd educatabil
ity are being given biological status. These were not always biological ques
tions, but society is now asking biologists to answer them. And biologists are
giving answers. Thus it is crucial that biologists be educated for social respon
sibility. I have been using feminist critiques of biology as one means of teaching
students to become critical of themselves and of biologically based stories in the
scientific and popular literature. I hope that these exercises will make the students
better scientists at the laboratory bench, in the classroom, and in public forums.
Feminist critique identifies some of the underlying social assumptions that infom1
the way scientists perform and interpret their experiments, but the uncovering of
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these stories does not lead to a relativistic stance toward biology. As we will
see, one of the main functions of feminist critiques in biology has been to
make the science "more objective." To be relativistic is to be irrelevant. Some
scientific stories are far more probable and supported by far more evidence
than others.
This approach comes from a very privileged perspective. First, the other
members of the Swarthmore College Biology Department have been support
ive of this endeavor, and several of them are also involved in introducing vari
ous critiques into their own classes. I am not even the only man in the science
departments who teaches courses in women and science. Second, the college
administration believes that educating socially responsible citizens is a major
priority of this Quaker-founded school (Bloom 1993). It has even obtained
funding for a group of scientists to read books in science studies. (Yes, a group
of a dozen real scientists-men and women-actually sat around a table and
rationally discussed Laboratory Life. I was there. It happened.) Third, at a lib
eral arts college, material from one subject is expected to be integrated with
other areas of knowledge. It is not unusual to have music majors or women's
studies concentrators in biology courses, and the students in the advanced bi
ology seminars are demanded to teach the other members of the seminar (in
cluding the faculty members). Fourth, my area of expertise, developmental
biology, is a field that involves describing how fertilization occurs, how sex is
created in the embryo, and how the brain is formed-issues that have been
considered central to defining one's maleness or femaleness. Indeed, when a
woman does feminist critique of biology, she is often revising her autobiogra
phy, and when a man engages in feminist critique of biology, he often revises
his perceptions (and his relationships) to women, nature, and society. Because
of the importance of developmental biology to one's self-definition and to the
problems of reproductive technology, several individuals and groups have
scrutinized this area and have written excellent critiques of its language, its
narratives, and its interactions with society (Biology and Gender Study Group
1988; Bleier 1985; Doane 1976; Eicher and Washburn 1986; Fausto-Sterling 1985;
Haraway 1976; Hubbard 1982; Hubbard and Wald 1993; Keller 1995; Martin
1991; Schatten and Schatten, 1983). This means that there is a literature in this
area that can sustain interest and active participation. This is not the case in all
areas of biology.
Many of the above-mentioned people who have written feminist critiques of
developmental biology have been trained as scientists. Thus, developmental bi
ology has seen a remarkable reform from within. The scientific data themselves
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have not been questioned so much as the types of questions thought important
and the interpretations drawn from experiments and observations. In most
instances, feminist critiques have been used to make the science "better" in the
normative sense. Feminist critiques were used as a control. Just as a good sci
entist would control for temperature, pressure, and solvent effects, so the sci
entist should also control for social biases and cultural assumptions. The
Biology and Gender Study Group (1988) has called this "controlling for social
biases"; Sandra Harding (1992) calls it "strong objectivity."
As with normative science, feminist critiques of developmental biology are
based on evidence. When I lecture on feminist critiques of biology, I often
start with the following quotation, reading directly from the book:
In all systems that we have considered, maleness means mastery, the Y-chro
mosome over the X, the medulla over the cortex, androgen over estrogen. So
physiologically speaking, there is no justification for believing in the equal
ity of the sexes. (Short 1972)
This evidence for social biases comes from a textbook published in 1972, when
I was a postdoctoral fellow (see Spanier 1984; this paragraph and others like it
are not to be found in the 1982 revision of this book). If nothing else, this type
of quotation shocks the students, jarring open the possibility that feminist cri
tique may have something to say to them. 1
We usually discuss feminist critiques during the laboratory rather than in
the classroom. There are several reasons for this. First, the entire class is to
gether in a more informal setting. Second, there is a lot of downtime in a de
velopmental biology laboratory: hurry up and wait is the norm. Third, the
laboratory studies often open themselves directly to feminist critique. So we
discuss feminist critiques of fertilization narratives after just having seen fer
tilization taking place in sea urchins, while we wait ninety minutes for the
first cell division to occur. Fourth, since laboratory grades depend on note
books and projects, students can discuss these issues without fear of being
graded on their views. Sometimes I have assigned the students to read cer
tain articles, and we have discussion immediately; other times, I have lec
tured to them about the articles, and then we discuss them. In no cases were
the students tested on this material. I feel that it is important to introduce
feminist critiques so that the students will be challenged to look at their as
sumptions and the assumptions of the literature. I do not ask for their agree
ment with it.
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11. Sperm Tales and Other Narratives
In the developmental biology laboratory, our first discussion of feminist cri
tique involves fertilization. I usually will ask the students to have read two arti
cles, "The Importance of Feminist Critique for Contemporary Cell Biology"
(Biology and Gender Study Group [BGSG) 1988) and "Sperm Wars" (Small
1991), before the laboratory period. After a general discussion of metaphors
(after Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), we discuss the sperm and the egg. They are,
after all, gametes, that is, marriage partners (from the Greek gamos, "mar
riage"). The BGSG paper looks specifically at the analogy sperm: man= egg:
woman, and it is an obvious analogy for all the students to see. They instantly
bring up the Look Who's Talking movies with the anthropomorphized sperm. I
sometimes point out the incredibly important difference between simile
( which, like analogy, is logical, explicit, and appeals to the brain) and
metaphor (which is magical, implicit, and appeals to the emotions). One never
hears someone say that the sperm is like a man and the egg is like a woman.
Rather, one hears about the "passive egg" being fulfilled by "the dynamic, ac
tive masculine vector of life." (The quotation here [referenced in BGSG 1988)
is from a speech by an important Dutch minister who used the fertilization
story to show how females are naturally passive and men are naturally active.)
The BGSG paper has documented an evolution of sperm stories that parallels
the roles that men and women were expected to play in society. In the 1800s,
the sperm was the egg's suitor. Later the sperm and the egg are depicted as
characters in a self-congratulatory
origin myth. Here, the sperm, like Joseph
Campbell's paradigmatic hero, is expelled, tested, challenged, and befriended,
and after a perilous journey wherein all but a few are lost, joins in a final con
test to see who gets the princess and founds a new kingdom. The egg is a pas
sive princess, the prize given to the victor. It even has a corona and vestments!
Schatten and Schatten (1983) have likened this story to the Sleeping Beauty
legend, wherein the passive princess is activated by the kiss of the prince (who
has survived the briars and brambles of the zona pellucida). If one wishes a
wonderful illustration of this nuptial view (where the sperm-man puckers his
lips and arouses the dormant egg-woman), check out the cover of the journal
Cell Differentiation and Development 29, no. 1 (January 1990). 2
In yet another modeling of fertilization on human interactions, the egg is
raped by the sperm (Russell 1977). The egg is depicted as turning a corner in
the oviduct, only to be attacked by the "army of spermatozoa" who "lie in wait
for the ovum." The egg isn't innocent, either. It attracts the sperm like "a pow
erful magnet." And here is where the "Sperm Wars" paper comes in. Written in
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1991 , it depicts the sperm as the ultimate warriors in the never-ending battle
against female promiscuity. Sperm are described as "tactically smart," "well
armed," and "a formidable .00024-inch weapon, tipped with a chemical war
head"! These "hardy footsoldiers" are depicted as overcoming challenge after
challenge, and "casualties in the sperm war are staggering." In a sociobiological
origins myth, the sperm are also said to be the evolutionary descendants of the
first warrior-raiders, who "broke into larger, more passive cells and captured
their neighbors." The distinction between active sperm and passive, larger,
more stable eggs is explicitly stated, and throughout the article the sperm's
weaponry is seen as directed both against other sperm and against the egg. The
egg is described as being "fortified" (against the "well-armed sperm") and as
the ultimate source of all this warfare: "The problem of sperm-and thus of
males-is, of course, the fault of females." Female philandering (and the
worry that this gives the male, who is, of course, concerned that any offspring
be his alone) caused these "sperm wars." For the same reason that Helen
caused the launching of a thousand ships, human males now launch 280 x 10 6
sperm per ejaculation! Here, the active male/passive female dichotomy is
joined with the notions of warrior sperm/males and whorish females/eggs
who are their prizes and victims. This idea of sperm as missile also sets up the
adolescent, militaristic, and unproductive metaphor of the penis as missile
launcher, gun, and so on-that is, as an organ of power. It takes the focus away
from alternative models such as seeing the mammalian penis as an organ that
has evolved the capacity for simultaneously giving and receiving pleasure.
Needless to say, class discussion on this can become pretty heated. Having the
students read the two papers together is also an interesting exercise in percep
tion. Those who read the BGSG paper first report that they found the material
in "Sperm Wars" ludicrous. Those who read "Sperm Wars" first accepted it
more readily until they read the BGSG essay. The end result, however, is usu
ally the same: no matter where the students started or ended, they have be
come aware of the storytelling component of developmental biology texts.
And this is when I get to ask the important question: "What story am I
telling in my textbook?" It takes them a while, but the students usually come to
the conclusion that I am telling a story about the interaction of equals. The
sperm and the egg mutually activate one another, and by a series of these acti
vations, the drama of fertilization is completed. This model is based on com
pelling biochemical data involving signal transduction pathways. And then I
can ask the most important question: "Is my story any less socially constructed
than the others we've discussed? Perhaps I'm just modeling my sperm and egg
after what I think a marriage should be. After all, I went to college in the 1960s,
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and my wife has her own name and her own career." Yes, what's in their text
book (which I wrote; Gilbert 1997) may be a story, too. I believe it to be an ac
curate account of fertilization, a better, more biochemical, and more balanced
story than what I had learned as a student. 3
I find that our laboratory discussions have been brought up in other classes
and in dormitory hallways. I have also found that the students do very well on the
fertilization portions of their examinations. My guess (and it is only that) is that
once the students become aware that there is a social component to science, they
realize that they too can become scientists and that there is nothing wrong with
bringing a sense of commitment and aesthetics into the laboratory with them.
Science is not for apersonal robots but for real people, and it always has been so.

111. Creating Sex: Bound by the Great Chain
Later in the semester, the developmental biology course discusses sex determi
nation. During the laboratory period (which is not about gonadal develop
ment), we get to talk about models of how sex is determined. This enables us
to debate the roles of one of the central paradigms of Western culture (and
many other cultures, for that matter), the Great Chain of Being. This is the chain
of the natural world that stretches from pure matter to pure mind. As A. 0.
Lovejoy (1942) points out, this paradigm has been one of the most ancient and
important ways to order our perceptions of the universe. In this scheme, all
the objects of the universe are thought to be arranged linearly, from the most
material to the most spiritual. At the bottom of the Great Chain lies rocks and
dirt; at the top are the orders of angels, leading to God. Between bottom and
top are linked all the rocks, plants, and animals. The eighteenth-century biolo
gist Charles Bonnet (1764) wrote that the chain extended without interruption
from "the first term, the atom" to "the highest of the Cherubim." The only
being that stands outside it, according to Bonnet, was "He who made it." Love
joy documents that "Man" was usually depicted in the middle, torn between
the rationality of the angels and the material urges of his animal nature. While
this doctrine is a discredited antievolutionary mode of organizing nature, it is
still with us and still causes our minds to elevate certain elements of nature
(those associated with the masculine) and denigrate others (those usually as
sociated with the feminine). In popular culture, even evolution is still often
seen as being a chain going from protists to "Man." 4
The assignment is to read and to be prepared to discuss a handout prepared
by the Biology and Gender Study Group (basically an earlier version of this
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essay) concerning sex determination and the Great Chain of Being. It starts
with the formulation of this paradigm in ancient Greece. Aristotle inherited
and propagated the Athenian view of the world wherein women were kept out
of public and were thought to be merely the incubators of the masculine seed.
In this society "the mother is not the parent of that which is called the child,
but only nurtures the seed that grows. The parent is he who plants the seed"
(Aeschylus, Eumenides [c. 475 B.c.E.]). Aristotle, in Generation of Animals (c.
330 B.C.E.) put this agricultural myth on a "scientific" basis, and he established
that the male was superior to the female: "For the female is, as it were, a muti
lated male, and the menstrual fluids are semen, only not pure, for they lack the
principle of soul"(737a27-29). For Aristotle, "the female qua female is passive,
and the male qua male is active and the principle of movement comes from
him"(729b13-14). This is extremely important for Aristotle and links gender to
hierarchy. Aristotle claims(732a3-9) that the goal of semen(= seed, = sperma)
is to produce a male. Semen gives the body its animating souls, while females
provide the lowest cause, matter. However, if the coldness of the woman into
which the semen is implanted overcomes the heat of the semen, this telos is
frustrated. Matter prevails over spirit, and the embryo becomes more material,
that is, a woman.
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, esp. 1.92.1, 2.70.3 [ c. 1258]) modified
this notion in his theory of sexuality: "Just as God can perfuse matter with form,
so can seminal power infuse form into the corporeal matter supplied by the
mother." Man produces the form, women supply the matter to be formed. In so
doing, the spirit infuses matter, and man reenacts God's Creation of Adam.
Aquinas, too, saw the production of females as a defect in the production of men
and viewed women as having as much claim to reason as a child or imbecile.
What has this to do with today's science? First, we show that Aquinas's trope
linking women to children and imbeciles would be continued until the early
twentieth century. Second, we show that both Aristotle's model and Aquinas's
model would be influential in directing scientific research. When Anton
Leeuwenhoek discovered and named sperm, he was convinced that it was in
deed as much a seed as those of plants. The notion that the sperm did not
physically interact with the egg but rather produced an aura seminalis that
acted on the egg at a distance was a dominant view in early modern science
(see Pinto-Correia 1997).
Third, this agricultural myth of planting the seed in the furrow is more than
just academically important. In a remarkable passage, Joseph Needham(1959)
provides many further examples of this denial of maternal inheritance in Greek
culture and notes, "Such an idea would have been a natural concomitant of the

a06

Scott F. Gilbert

practice-widespread in antiquity-of putting captured males to death, and
retaining the females as concubines. The conquerors would thus have no fear
of corrupting the race with alien blood. The whole matter affords an excellent
illustration of the way in which an apparently academic theory may have the
most intimate connections with social and political behavior, and Aristotle far
from being remote from practical affairs ...is seen to be laboring at their very
root." During the recent "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia, our discussions of this
view of life took on more immediacy than before.
Fourth, the inferiority of women was a major assumption linked to racism
until very recently. In some classes (especially classes in feminist critiques
where I give one or two lectures concerning the sciences) I ask the students to
think of cases where the Great Chain may have influenced their thinking. Usu
ally, three stand out. One example is religion (viewing Christianity as "higher"
than Judaism, rather than seeing a branched chain of evolution from a com
mon precursor), and the others are race and gender. Here, I bring in concrete
examples to show that science has been used to bolster the claim that white
men are higher than white women or people of color. For example, Carl Vogt
(1864), professor of natural history at the University of Geneva, foreign associ
ate of the Anthropological Society of Paris, and honorary fellow of the Anthro
pological Society of London, claimed, "By its rounded apex and less developed
posterior lobe, the Negro brain resembles that of our children, and by the pro
truberance of the parietal lobe, that of our females" (81-82). Thus, blacks and
women are like immature white males. He concluded this paragraph by stating
that the brain characteristics together "assign to the Negro brain a place by the
side of that of a white child;' while "the female European skull resembles much
more the Negro skull than that of the European male." Nor was Vogt alone. He
quoted numerous studies, including that of the anthropologist Hushke, who
concluded that "in the Negro brain, both the cerebellum and the cerebrum, as
well as the spinal cord, present the female and infantile European as well as the
simious type" (Vogt 1864, 172-83). Blacks, women, and children thus link the
apes to adult white males. Women and people of color were routinely seen as
being between white males and the rest of nature. 5
G. W. F. Hegel (1821) makes the analogy that women are to men as plants are to
animals. That is, they approach the level of individuality but do not cross into it:
Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which
demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy,
and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste,
and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal.The difference between men
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and women is like that between animals and plants.Men correspond to ani
mals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more
placid and the principle that underlies it is a vague unity of feeling.... The
status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of
thought and much technical exertion. (263-64)
Lloyd and others show that throughout Western thought, the dominant view
was that women are like men but have not fully developed the capacity for ra
tional thought. Indeed, this is still the attitude inculcated into students by cer
tain medical school professors (see Fugh-Berman 1992). Thus, women are
depicted as something between animals and man.
Although evolutionary theory went directly against the notion of a Great
Chain of Being, the early evolutionary biologists did not realize this, and their
anthropology remains full of Great Chain imagery. Evolutionists Thomas Hux
ley, Ernst Haeckel, E. D. Cope, and Herbert Spencer still held the Aristotelian no
tion that women were like men, but their development or evolution had been
truncated (see Sayers 1982). Sigmund Freud and other psychiatrists and psychol
ogists similarly theorized that femininity was an immature stage of male devel
opment, and some of the world's leading sexologists proclaimed that femaleness
was the default state for humanity, and that maleness was pushing beyond that
state into a new condition. As Money and Tucker (1975) have written,
Nature's first choice is to make Eve. Everybody has one X chromosome and
is surrounded by a mother's estrogens during prenatal life. Although not
enough for full development as a fertile female, this gives enough momen
tum to support female development.Development for a male requires effec
tive propulsion in the male direction at every critical stage. Unless the
required "something more:' the Adam principle, is provided in correct pro
portions and at the proper times, the individual's subsequent development
follows the female pattern.
Horowitz (1976) has noted that theories of sex determination are influenced
by the Great Chain of Being, and it wasn't until two biologists, Linda Wash
burn and Eva Eicher (1986), demonstrated the social assumptions behind this
story that biology could study the development of the sexual phenotype as
branching from an indifferent origin. Washburn and Eicher fought against the
notion, common in many textbooks, that femaleness was the "default state" of
mankind. Rather, they contended, maleness and femaleness are both active,
gene-directed processes that originate from a bipotent gonad. They pointed
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out that "sex determination" had equaled "male determination," and that this
was a social view, scientifically invalid. They showed where the mistake had
been made and showed the evidence against it. They also wrote that as long as
this view so dominated biology, the search would be for testis-forming genes,
and there would be no reason to search for the genes that directed the bipotent
gonad to form the ovaries. While the search for testis-forming genes had been
an ongoing research project for decades, it was only in the 1990s that the first
ovary-forming genes were looked for and discovered. Paradigms such as the
Great Chain of Being can influence what research projects are feasible. And we
are now discussing contemporary biology. The female-as-default state model
is still explicit in some textbooks (Muller 1997, 305).
It is important to discuss these mythological paradigms because we have
reason to believe they still lie buried within our science and influence the way
we perceive the natural and cultural worlds. These biases of the intellectual
landscape must be identified if we are to free ourselves from them.

IV. It Is Reigning DNA
In my course in developmental genetics, we talk a great deal about regulation
(from the Latin regulare, "to rule"), one of the principal concepts in molecular
biology. The concept need not be hierarchical, as components from one level
can interact with those "above" or "below" it in a form of self-regulatory feed
back. Indeed, there are many examples of dialectical regulation in biology.
Embryologists and molecular biologists have long known that just as the genes
determine the proteins of the cytoplasm, the cytoplasm determines which
genes are to be expressed. However, in the case of the cell, much of the imagery
of regulation concerns only the rule of the nucleus over the cytoplasm.
In previous papers (BGSG 1988; Gilbert 1988), we documented the histori
cal modeling of sperm-egg interactions on cultural paradigms of male-female
relationships: courtship and marriage, conquest and consummation, rape, and
dialogue. It seems that the cells were doing on a micro-level just what their re
spective humans were expected to do on the macro-level. In these papers, we
also attempted to show that this male/female, husband/wife imagery continued
to be placed on the zygote. In four models of the cell published in the 1930s, the
roles of the nucleus and the roles of the cytoplasm mirrored the roles of the
husband and the wife, respectively, in four family-based models of the cell. In
what was probably an unconscious appropriation of gender (and class) ideol
ogy, each researcher projected a version of a husband-wife relationship onto
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the nucleus and cytoplasm. However, returning to this issue in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, we no longer find the cell being modeled after the family.
Rather, the cell has become a business enterprise.The nucleus is still masculine
and the cytoplasm still feminine; but the mode of analogy has become the ra
tionality/matter dichotomy.In this view, the nucleus is depicted as the rational
component of the cell, the cytoplasm as the material part of the cell.6 Here is
one depiction of the cell as a factory (Baltimore 1984; quoted in Keller 1995):
The factory whose structure preoccupies biology today is the cell....Cells
are incredibly complicated, and it was not immediately apparent how they
were organized and integrated.Biologists needed to find the cell's brain.
This brain, we are then told, is the nucleus.Thus, the rationality of the body's
brain has been transferred into the nucleus of the cell. So has the executive
function of the factory's manager:
The approach of genetics ...is to ask about the blueprints, not the machines;
about decisions, not mechanics; about information and history.In the factory
analogy, genetics leaves the greasy machines and goes to the executive suite,
where it analyses the planners, the decision makers, the historical records.It is
the business school approach rather than the engineering approach.
In this story, the nucleus is the brain, the cytoplasm the body; the nucleus is
the executive suite, the cytoplasm the factory floor. Rationality over matter.
This metaphor of nucleus as executive accords very well with both the "master
molecule" theory of molecular biology (see BGSG 1988; Hubbard 1982; Hub
bard and Wald 1993; Keller 1985; Spanier 1995) and with the sociobiologists' be
lief that the body is only the vehicle for the propagation of more DNA.
Sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (1986), looking at the willow seeds falling out
side his window, says,
It is raining DNA outside....The cotton wool is made mostly of cellulose,
and it dwarfs the capsule that contains DNA, the genetic information. The
DNA content must be a small proportion of the total so why did I say that it
was raining DNA rather than raining cellulose? The answer is that it is the
DNA that matters .... The whole performance-cotton wool, catkins, tree
and all-is in aid of one thing and one thing only, the spreading of DNA
around the countryside .... It is raining instructions out there; it's raining
programs; it's raining tree-growing fluff-spreading
algorithms. This is not
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metaphor, it is plain truth. It couldn't be plainer if it were raining floppy
discs. (m)

Of course it's metaphor, and it comes right off the Great Chain of Being. It is
rationality dominating matter. It is looking at the executive suite and believing
that the factory floor is of no consequence except as a reflection of executive
decisions. It is looking at information as being superior to the material that
"carries" it. It is seeing the phenotype as a mere elaboration of the genotype, of
the nucleus as ruler. It is the information economy rather than the production
economy. It is the Human Genome Project, whose goal, according to its for
mer director, Nobel Laureate James Watson, is "to find out what being human
is." It is reigning DNA.

V. Gender, the Chain, and the Disciplines
The Great Chain concept can cause more immediate problems, as well. A few
years ago, a student confided that she had trouble convincing herself to major
in biology. Biology, she declared, was "so far down on the hierarchy," and she
didn't think that the best minds would work there. When asked, "What hierar
chy?" her answer was, "You know. There's math on the top, then physics, then
chemistry, then, down at the bottom, biology."
Of course. That hierarchy. We have all heard of that hierarchy, and many of
us have accepted it, internalized it unthinkingly. "What is it a hierarchy of"?
Her answer was the one expected: "Hardness." The real sciences at the top of
the hierarchy were the "hard sciences," and everything else was "softer;' "less
rigid." Math and physics were hard and rigid, biology was soft (not "easy"
the other antonym of hard). Indeed, physics, math, and chemistry are seen as
masculine domains, whereas biology seems somewhat friendlier to women.
What we are seeing is a playing out of the Great Chain of Being.
While the Great Chain had originally circumscribed the universe, we now
see it extending across the university. We are dealing with the superiority of
abstraction over material, with the masculine souls over the feminine matter.
The "progression" from biology to mathematics is the abstraction of rational
ity from nature. Biology deals with dirty matter: blood, guts, menstrual fluid,
semen, urine, leaf mold, frogs, jellyfish, lions, tigers, and bears. Chemistry
deals with matter purified and quantified: 2M NaHCO3, 4 mg/ml KCl. Physics
deals with idealized matter (when it deals with matter at all): ideal gases, elec
tron probability clouds, frictionless surfaces. (If physics deals too much with
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material, it falls down the Chain to become engineering.) Finally, mathematics
claims to have escaped matter altogether!
In the pure mathematics we contemplate absolute truths which existed in
the divine mind before the morning stars sang together, and which will con
tinue to exist when the last of their radiant host shall have fallen from the
heaven. (E. Everett, quoted in Bell 1931, 20).
In a similar vein, Oswald Spengler (1927) celebrated "the liberation of geome
try from the visual, and of algebra from the notion of magnitude." The levels
of mathematics, it would seem, have replaced the orders of angels in our mod
ern hierarchy. There are, as expected in such a Chain, bridge disciplines. Ac
cording to this view, molecular biology and biochemistry are the highest
biology and the lowest chemistry, respectively. Physical chemistry is the high
est chemistry, and theoretical physics the highest physics. Thus, as one rises on
the Chain, matter becomes more and more abstracted until even the idea of
matter is no longer present. 7
As mentioned above, even within a field there are successive links in the
Chain. In biology, the "higher" disciplines are those in which abstraction pre
dominates. Molecular biology is an excellent example, since it abstracts the
underlying unity of the disparate living species and thereby cares little about
the actual organs of the plant or beast. It sets a premium on "information," not
substances. On the other hand, those disciplines concerned with the actual
phenotypic organism (such as taxonomy, invertebrate biology, mammology,
or anatomy) are considered low in both prestige and funding. Within a subdis
cipline such as developmental biology or physiology, the more abstract, the
"higher" the area appears. A. J. Levine and Jay Geller (personal communica
tion) have commented that another reason that certain disciplines and subdis
ciplines are at the bottom of the hierarchy is that in those fields there is more
dependence upon matter in experimentation. There is more variability in the
matter used, and experiments take time, as control over that matter has not
been achieved. Anyone who has designed experiments for undergraduates can
appreciate this. Moreover, as Spanier has pointed out, some biology courses
(such as nutrition and human biology), concerned exclusively with material
things as opposed to theoretical models, are accorded low esteem and are seen
as female areas of specialization.
So as one moves up the chain, one has more rationality and less base matter.
Not accidentally, the adjectives are coded as masculine: "harder, more rigorous?'
Genevieve Lloyd (1984) has documented the historical associations between
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mind, reason, and maleness, on one hand, and body, matter, and femaleness
on the other: "Matter, with its overtones of femaleness, is seen as something to
be transcended in the search for rational knowledge" (5). She continues by
noting that "this Platonic theme recurs throughout the history of Western
thought in ways that both exploit and reinforce the longstanding associations
between maleness and form, femaleness and matter." Transcendence means
the transcendence of the body, of matter, and of the female. Thus in the "ratio
nal" sciences, the abstract disciplines are seen as more male, while those in
volved primarily with the matter at hand are seen as more female. To move a
science up the Chain in biology, add some molecular biology to it (as is
presently being done with botany). To move a profession up the Chain, add
training in the abstractions of the discipline (as was done to separate obstet
rics from midwifery). To attract graduate students and funding, change the
departmental name from a phenotypic science (anatomy, zoology, botany,
physiology) to the appropriate cellular or molecular science. In all these cases,
the change appears masculinizing. It is not surprising if women perceive the
more abstract sciences as less friendly or less congruent with the norms that
they have internalized: "This is the pattern in all fields. The higher the level of
mathematics required, the greater the proportion of men" (Cole 1991, 7). One
of the main obstacles to women entering into careers in the abstract sciences
may be our subscribing to the paradigm of the Great Chain. 8 By identifying
this myth, we can more readily ask why some disciplines seem more "mascu
line" than others and whether that is merely a socially accepted perception.

VI. Coda: What Can We Do?
Educating scientists for social responsibility is an enormous undertaking, and
introducing biology students to feminist critiques of science is only one way of
trying to accomplish this. The ability to recognize and deconstruct social
agendas in science will help the student to be both a better scientist and a bet
ter citizen. Feminist critique is not out to politicize science-quite the reverse,
it documents that there already are social values in science. The first step is to
identify which social paradigms and narratives are being used to constrain sci
ence. Here, the humanities can play an important role in scientific education.
The myth of the hero, the Great Chain of Being, the paradigms of progress and
salvation, are all stories that are part of our culture, and science must not ac
cept these "default" conditions on its interpretations. The humanities can pro
vide alternative sources of interpretation, alternative stories. My own research
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as a scientist has been influenced by courses in Japanese culture (which en
abled me to write a paper criticizing a particular theory of evolution as being
predicated on a specifically Western view of individuality; Gilbert 1992), phi
losophy (where my having read Whitehead predisposed me to think in terms
of process rather than structure; Gilbert et al. 1996), and feminist critiques
(which encourage multilevel networks of causation).
The second step is to problematize those stories once one has seen them.
There are at least three strategies for doing so. The first is to simply identify
them and deconstruct them. When the interpretation of scientific data on
sperm is seen to be based on a myth, it loses its "objectivity" and its scientific
hold on us. The second is to identify the metaphors and to make them into
similes and analogies. When one has taken an implicit metaphor ("the master
gene") and turned it into an analogy (genes are to masters as other genes and
proteins are to servants or slaves), some of the social values become apparent.
Third, one can try to find alternative metaphors. In one sense, the embryo
might "burrow" into the uterus. In another sense, it "invades" the uterus. It
also "embeds" within the uterus and "implants" within the uterus. All these
verbs give a different image to that embryonic-maternal interaction. None is
precisely correct (see Ballantyne 1905). All have their places. (We will never be
able to avoid metaphors. It is important to see several metaphors and to recog
nize what facets of the phenomena they are privileging).
It is difficult to introduce such social critiques into science. Certainly, it is
difficult for science textbooks to do so. The textbooks have become larger and
larger as the amount of information accumulates. Similarly, teachers have to
decide what topics they are going to abandon in order to teach the newer ma
terial. If anything, it has become more difficult to bring historical and other
cultural matters into science books and classes. We have been experimenting
with a hybrid media textbook, a textbook that includes URLs within it. Thus,
the current edition of Developmental Biology connects to a website (http://zy
gote.swarthmore.edu) that contains (in addition to updates in this rapidly
moving field) debates on gendered metaphors in fertilization and on when
human life begins, essays about alcohol and the fetus, discussions of germline
genetic manipulation, cloning, and sex selection, and an overview of feminist
critiques of sex determination. We hope that these will enrich the curriculum
in ways that a standard textbook cannot.
Feminist critique matters. First, it challenges the assumptions of students in
the best Socratic tradition. Second, it makes them examine evidence critically.
These are in the best traditions of science education. One of the definitions of
liberal arts education is "to recognize quality when you see it." I contend that
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much of science education in the liberal arts is "to recognize garbage when you
see it." When newspapers uncritically report a "cure for" cancer or a "gene for"
some behavior, one should be able to criticize the reportage. Feminist critique
in developmental biology is especially important, since developmental biology
has so much to say about what sex and gender is. One of the first critiques of
developmental biology was a pamphlet published by the Woman's Caucus of
the Society for Developmental Biology (Doane 1976; see Gilbert and Rader, in
press), which merely reprinted verbatim some of the sexist quotations in the
literature and made cartoons of them. The pamphlet noted that "Male chau
vinistic views of ancient times are still to be found among the presumably ob
jective writings of our scientific colleagues." Feminist critique is being used to
make the science better. It also attempts to make it less harmful. A theory
about the stars doesn't affect the being of the stars, but a theory about men
and women can determine who we think we actually are and what behaviors
are normal or permissible.
The language of science can also determine who enters it. This is also im
portant in science education. Bonnie Spanier (1992) has introduced Judith
Fetterley's notion of the "resisting reader" into discussions of feminism and
science. Why should a woman enter a field that tells her she is a default state, a
passive entity that is a failed version of a man? Again, feminist critique is im
portant in opening possibilities to women.
While feminist critiques of biology often look at the rhetoric and narrative
elements of the discipline, this does not mean that one theory or one set of
words is as good as any other. As said earlier, relativism has no place in either
science or feminist critiques of science. Science is not going to go away, and if
it were to be destroyed, we would spend generations trying to build it again.
However, feminist critiques can play a major role in opening up students to
the social dimensions of science in the hope that they can use their knowledge
and power in ways that will allow biology to be liberating and not oppressing.
In the first decades of the next millennium, biology will have enormous power,
and its practitioners have to know about its possible abuses.

Notes
1. As noted by Barbara Tomlinson (1995), I tend to use irony, humor, and light
mockery to make my points. My aim is to make the students question their assump
tions, and this is often best done by reading the text in the light of other contexts. For
instance, looking at the metaphors in a science text in the light of feminist critique
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should make one more critical of the creative language of science. I mean, what are we
to make of a biology book (published in 1996) that calls the contribution of the
oocytes their "dowries," informs us that the acrosome of the sperm is "a chemical drill,"
and tells us that the activation of the egg is "Sleeping Beauty awakened with a kiss"? If I
repeat any particular words or phrases during the class debates over feminist critique
in biology, they would have to be, "What is the evidence?" and "Can you think of an
other interpretation of the data?" These phrases will be all too familiar to any person
who has had graduate training in biology. Feminist critique is being used as a control.
2. In addition to the Look Who's Talking movies, the male sperm and female eggs are
depicted in many jokes and cartoons. In these depictions (such as those of Gary
Larsen), each sperm is trying hard to enter the egg, sometimes by stealth, sometimes by
outboard motor, and sometimes just by adolescent speed. Recent versions show some
interesting feminist modifications. One of these (Long, 1994) shows dozens of sperm
surrounding the egg, but staying around a half inch away. The caption reads, "Scientists
prove that men's fear of commitment begins at an early age." In one joke, the question is
raised as to why it takes 300 million sperm to fertilize an egg. The answer is that none of
them will ask directions. I should point out that just as there are some feminists who are
interested in equal wages and who are not interested in critique, there are some scien
tists who use "sexist" representations of sperm and egg, but who nevertheless have been
extremely supportive of women in their professional careers.
3. Martin (1991), for instance, contends that the narratives of equals may not be ap
propriate, since the egg has not only a nucleus but all the cytoplasmic apparatus for cell
division and development. The sperm is only a motile nucleus. On the biochemical
level, though, the sperm-and-egg story can be told as the interaction between two different cells with remarkable underlying similarities. Martin (1992), I am very glad to
say, has found that this textbook (Gilbert 1997) has brought some of her students to see
the value of feminist critique in biology.
4. To emphasize that this conceit is still very much with us, I bring in a 1998 Conti
nental Bank advertisement from Newsweek and a Strategene advertisement from a 1994
issue of Cell. The evolutionary text of the bank copy is undercut by its straight Great
Chain from protist to white male banker. The Strategene "A Bold Leap in Cloning" ad
vertisement for its new vector resembles anthropology textbook illustrations from a
hundred years earlier, representing the progressive evolution of plasmids by (in order
of complexity) a woman of color, a man of color, a white woman, and a white man.
(Again, I point out that this may have nothing to do with the hiring or promotion
practices of these companies concerning women and minorities.) The evolutionary
figure would be a branched bush with all extant forms having equal "height." In the
Great Chain, one leads into the other.
5. In 1799 surgeon and biologist Charles White published a treatise on the Great Chain
of Being in which he spent much energy looking at the links between animals and hu
mans. To view the chain as complete, he elevated the apes while degrading women and
black Africans. The apes are given traits such as the ability to perform simple medical
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operations, and W hite claims that orangutans "have been known to carry off negro
boys, girls, and even women with a view of making them subservient to their wants as
slaves" (see Gould 1985, 281-90). Haraway's Primate Visions (1989) shows that modern
science is capable of the same trick, depicting women and blacks as the evolutionary
and developmental links between white men and apes.In discussing the women whose
research on nonhuman African primates was covered by National Geographic, Har
away remarks,
Gender in the western narrative works simply here: Woman is closer to nature than
Man and so mediates more readily (Ortner, 1972). Positioned by the symbology, real
women are put into the service of culturally reproducing Woman as Man's channel. ...
Women and animals are set up as body with depressing regularity in the working of the
mind/body binarism in story fields, including scientific ones.The man/animal bina
rism is crosscut with two others which structure the narrative possibilities: mind/body
and light/dark. White women mediate between "man" and "animal" in power-charged
historical fields. Colored women are often so closely held by the category animal that
they can barely function as mediators in texts produced within white culture.... The
body is nature to the mind of culture; in primate narratives, white women negotiate
the chasm.(149-50)
6. Here is one of the differences between genetics and embryology. Embryologists
have long known that just as the nucleus controls the cytoplasm, the proteins of the cy
toplasm regulate which genes are expressed.This was stated succinctly by Hans Driesch
in 1894 (see Gilbert 1997, 595). Embryological phenomena regulated by the cytoplasm
include (1) cells of mosaic embryos wherein the cytoplasm directly determines the
gene expression of the cells acquiring different cytoplasmic entities; (2) regulative em
bryos wherein the determination of cell fate depends upon the location of the cell; and
(3) DNA synthesis wherein the creation of new DNA helices and subsequent cell divi
sion is controlled by enzymes within the cytoplasm.In the operon model of gene regu
lation, the state of the cytoplasm determines whether or not particular sets of genes
shall be transcribed. Scientists such as Paul Weiss and C. H. Waddington likened the
nucleus to a library or a toolbox rather than a command center (see Gilbert 1991), and
Waddington explicitly reversed the geneticists' imagery by writing about the "activa
tion of the genome." As early as 1887, embryologist C. 0.Whitman noticed the link to
Aristotle. The nucleus, he said, is being misrepresented as Aristotle's primum mobile,
the ultimate source of unchanging rationality. It should be noted that ideas change.
The linkage between sociobiology and molecular biology is forcefully made in Spanier
1991. The quotation from David Baltimore seems more indicative of his views in the
1980s than his much more integrative views of the 1990s.
The cell is not the only entity undergoing a transition from family metaphor to fac
tory metaphor. The laboratory is also experiencing this shift. This can be very impor
tant for women, since many women (and men) can probably envision themselves as
the heads of families better than they can see themselves as heads of factories. (Salome
Waelsch Cole (1991] notes that the skills needed to run a family are very similar to
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those needed to run a laboratory). There are also other differences. In the family, pro
duction is important, but so is the education of the subordinate members to become
heads of their own families. In the factory metaphor, such education is not as impor
tant a goal. Also (as pointed out by a reviewer of this manuscript) the incest taboo may
be stronger under the model of family than factory.
7. According to Patricia Phillips (1991), science was not always accorded this posi
tion. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, science was perceived to deal with
material things, while knowledge of classics marked the true gentleman. To deal with
science meant having "too close an acquaintance with the artisan or industrial classes,
which in turn cast doubts on a man's social and intellectual status." Classics was higher
in spirituality and rationality than base science. Thus, men monopolized the classics,
allowing women to enter the lesser sphere, science. According to Phillips, this associa
tion of women and science lasted until reforms in education enabled women to study
classics in the mid-nineteenth century. Only when science became identified with ra
tionality and abstract thought did it, too, become off-limits
to women. While the Great
Chain may be readily evident in the sciences, it seems that departments in the human
ities and social sciences divisions also put a premium on the theoretical rather than the
practical areas of their disciplines.
8. It could be argued that the raison d'etre of science was to force rationality upon
nature, and that Francis Bacon and others saw nature as a female form to be acted
upon by masculine reason (Lloyd 1984; Keller 1985). While the notion of science being
a rational abstraction of nature certainly has its masculinist elements and conforms all
too easily with the Great Chain of Being paradigm (see also the related nature/culture
paradigm discussed in Ortner 1972 and Gilbert 1979), I doubt that the notion that na
ture must be subdued or conquered is a typically masculinist idea. I ask my students
for evidence to support or refute this idea, and I point out that until this century,
nearly one out of every two European children died before adolescence. Even in upper
class families, the mortality through childhood was close to 50 percent. Nature was not
seen as fragile and benevolent except by a few poets. Before antibiotics and the popula
tion explosion of this century, nature was seen as indomitable and harsh. Women rou
tinely died in childbirth or shortly thereafter. I doubt that conquering nature was
something that only men wanted done.
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